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In the 10th century, the nomadic Khitan, with their Liao dynasty, became the most dominant power 
in East Asia, posing enormous threats to the Chinese Song dynasty in the south. Based on an analy-
sis of the traditional Chinese world view, this paper examines the two opposing views of the Song 
Chinese about their Khitan neighbours in the north. The Song Chinese acknowledged the military 
prowess of the Khitan and thus advocated flexible diplomatic policies based on realistic observa-
tion and careful assessment, demonstrated by the diplomatic parity set by the Treaty of Chanyuan 
in 1005. In the meantime, many held firm belief in their cultural superiority over the “barbarians”, 
which derived from the tradition of a cultural sino-centrism. The Song looked for Confucian sources 
to justify their concession by turning their attention to the cultivation of virtue and were confident 
that they were the centre of culture and civilisation. 
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Servants and slaves insult their masters, 
Barbarians invade China. 
This injustice has been so since ancient age, 
To resolve the problem there is no way.1 
Shao Yong 邵雍 (1011–1077) 
Throughout China’s long history, the presence of foreign menace has always loomed 
large. Indeed, the record of China’s conflicts with her pastoral nomadic and semi-
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1 Translated from the poem “Moaning on Calamities” (Sihuan yin 思患吟) collected in 
Shao’s anthology Yichuan jirang ji 伊川擊壤集 (compiled around 1080, reprint 1922, 16: 117). For 
a biography of Shao, see Franke (1976, pp. 849–857). 
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nomadic neighbours in Central and Northeastern Asia is a long and convoluted one. 
Limited by the peculiar environment of the steppe and grassland, peoples and tribes 
to the north raided Chinese territory to obtain grain, textile, and crafted goods. Later 
on, they also developed a taste for Chinese tea, porcelain, and other commodities. 
When these items could not be acquired peacefully through trade, they attacked Chi-
nese settlements to obtain them by force.  
 In response to such raids, a few Chinese dynasties – such as the Han 漢 (206 
BC–220 AD) and Tang 唐 (618–907) – sought to and sometimes did vanquish the 
adjacent nomadic peoples. These campaigns became a part of the standard “pacifica-
tion” narrative for China’s relations with its “barbarian” neighbours. Yet, during peri-
ods of internal disunity, when non-Chinese regimes took partial control of Chinese 
territory and no Chinese court could truthfully claim to be the sole existing authority, 
a different historical reality emerges. The prolonged era of north–south division that 
lasted from the end of the Han dynasty to reunification of Sui 隋 (589–618) saw the 
first example of this reality with a succession of non-Chinese regimes that devastated 
north China. The most notable case of diplomatic parity, at least in political and mili-
tary terms, was the one between the nomadic Northern Wei 北魏 (386–534) of the 
Xianbei 鲜卑 people and its Chinese counterparts in the south (Di Cosmo 2002; 
Lewis 2009). Despite frequent wars that disrupted and impacted the conduct of for-
eign affairs, these states always attempted to carefully nurture and maintain mutual re-
lations on an equal footing.2 This development marked a milestone in China’s history 
of interacting with non-Chinese states in a manner of recognising each other as equals; 
furthermore, it established to some extent a set of diplomatic practices that was 
continued by the later empires, in particular the Song 宋 (960–1279) and the Liao 遼 
(907–1125).3 
 Fifty years after the collapse of the once-mighty Tang empire, its Chinese ter-
ritory were spilt into the Ten Kingdoms 十國, whose rulers were generally Chinese, 
and the Five Dynasties 五代, whose potentates were mostly of foreign or half-foreign 
origin.4 When the Song dynasty ended the Five Dynasties in 960, it had to accept a 
geopolitical landscape in which the Chinese were surrounded by militant neighbours: 
in the southwest the Nanzhao 南詔 and Annan 安南 had established themselves as 
regional powers before the founding of the Song; along the western border were the 
Tibetans and the Tangut kingdom of Xi Xia 西夏 (1038–1227); and further north,  
a new and powerful nomadic group from southern Mongolia known as the Khitan 
(Qidan 契丹) had consolidated the Mongolian steppe and Manchuria, absorbed a large  
 
 
2 Various historical records on diplomatic exchanges between these states show that both 
sides of the Chinese and the Toba carefully selected eloquent and knowledgeable envoys from the 
gentry class to ensure their diplomatic equality. On the relations between the Northern Wei and its 
southern neighbours, see Eberhard (1949, pp. 162–167).  
3 Divided by the fall of the Song capital into the hands of the Jurchen in 1127 and the sub-
sequent reduction of territory to the south of the Huai river, the Song period is commonly divided 
into the Northern Song 北宋 (960–1127) and the Southern Song 南宋 (1127–1276). 
4 Although somehow dated, the standard source on this period is Wang (1963). For a recent 
account, see Lorge (2011). 
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tract of land inside China stretching from present Beijing to modern Datong (Shanxi 
province), and founded a Chinese-style dynasty named the Liao. The Song was one 
of the most important political and military players during this era, but it was not the 
principal one. The Song court, then, found that they could not impose a Chinese-cen-
tric scheme of conducting foreign relations on their Khitan neighbours (Kuhn 2009, 
p. 20). 
 Both John King Fairbank (1941, 1968) and Mark Mancall (1963, 1968) made 
ground-breaking contributions to the scholarship on imperial China’s view of world 
order and foreign relations. Their studies laid the foundation for our current 
understanding of how the Chinese perceived their neighbouring peoples and the out-
side world. Yet, there have been few attempts to place these inquiries in the particular 
setting of Song–Liao parity. How did the Song Chinese perceive and view their rela-
tions to the Khitan? Were such perceptions and views unified within the Song? If not, 
what were the differences? In what way did the different views of Khitan influence 
Song policy towards their pastoral neighbours in the north and vice versa? What can 
these views inform us about China’s historical conception of world order and foreign 
relations? 
 In an effort to answer these questions, this paper analyses the Song scholars’ 
and officials’ diverse views toward the Khitan. Its first part will outline the origin and 
characteristics of the traditional Chinese world order and its conceptualisation of for-
eign relations, focusing in particular on the stereotypes of non-Chinese peoples on 
Chinese borders, known as “barbarians” to the Chinese. Then, drawing on earlier ob-
servations by Morris Rossabi (1983), Jing-shen Tao [Jingsheng Tao] (1988) and David 
Curtis Wright (2005), it analyses two opposing views on the Khitan within the Song 
through an investigation of contemporary Song writings, both official and private. This 
examination reveals that Song officials understood the impracticality of challenging 
the status quo and thus advocated relatively realistic and flexible policies towards the 
Liao. At the same time, however, they also chose to emphasise Song’s cultural supe-
riority over the Khitan – even though the Song could not claim to be the political or 
military centre of the world, they were confident that they were the centre of culture 
and civilisation. 
Civilised and Barbarian: Traditional Chinese World Order 
As early as the first millennium BC, there already existed enclaves of non-Han tribes 
on the northern and western frontiers of China. Indeed, their incursions into Chinese 
territory eventually wiped out the Western Zhou 西周 dynasty (1122 BC–771 BC) 
and forced the Chinese court to move eastward. It was probably during this time that 
China’s traditional, specifically Confucian, attitudes toward alien peoples began to 
take shape. A famous passage from the Book of Poetry (Shijing 詩經) quoted in the 
Works of Mencius reads:  
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“Under the whole heaven, every spot is the sovereign’s ground; To the 
borders of the land, every individual is the sovereign’s minister” (Legge 
1861, p. 352).5  
These words shine lights on imperial China’s somewhat amorphous idea of the proper 
world order. Encompassing the known and unknown territories, the world in Chinese 
eyes became “all under heaven” (tianxia 天下), of which China perceived itself to be 
the very centre (Fairbank 1968, p. 2). In this vague but pervasive sense of an all-em-
bracing domain of tianxia, the Chinese emperor claimed to be the Son of Heaven 
(tianzi 天子), the one who had supreme power to reign and rule over all human affairs. 
China’s very name, Zhongguo 中國, denoted a sense of the “Middle Kingdom” or 
“Central State”. Traditional Chinese perception of its place in the world was thus 
characterised by an overwhelming sense of “sino-centrism” that centred on Chinese 
attitudes toward itself and others for over two millennia, from the 3rd century BC to 
the early 20th century (Wang 1999, p. 287). 
 The concept of Zhongguo, however, was not a fixed territory limited by geo-
graphical boundaries. Instead of conceptualising it by definition of territory or sover-
eignty, the real Chinese understanding of the world is probably best understood through 
a cultural approach. The ancient Chinese asserted that they possessed a sophisticated 
culture, a written language, as well as magnificent cities and palaces, all of which 
their neighbours sorely lacked. Thus the Chinese divided the universe into two worlds: 
“inside were the Chinese (zhuxia 諸夏) and outside were the barbarians (yidi 夷敵)” 
(Chunqiu Gongyang zhuan, 371).6 In other words, the civilised Chinese centre was 
surrounded by an uncivilised world of barbarians. They could be allowed to reside in 
the Chinese world and be recognised as equals of Chinese, provided that they adopted 
Chinese customs and were assimilated to Chinese cultural norms. 
 Against this conceptual background, one may detect a general tone of arro-
gance and even cultural chauvinism from the ancient Chinese orthodox classics.  
In the Chinese view, what constituted China was not, at least not solely, fixed border 
lines which defined its territory and political sovereignty, but rather a self-conscious-
ness which was primarily based on the moral commitment created from civil achieve-
ment as well as the culturally hierarchical and self-centred attitude towards the pe-
ripheral peoples (Smith 1996, p. 7). In other words, China’s version of culturalism 
did not concern itself with geographical separation, but placed a premium on the 
distinction between civilisation and barbarity. The state of barbarity, in traditional 
Chinese conception, was not designated by race, religion, language, or national ori-
gin. Instead, civilisation and barbarity were conceptually related in that “they defined 
each other” (Mancall 1968, p. 63). “Barbarians” were those who “did not accept Chi-
nese civilisation and who knew not the refinement of ceremony, music, and culture” 
 
5 Legge’s term “minister” for chen 臣, as far as I am concerned, is an over-translation, while 
“servant” or “subject” might be a more accurate one. 
6 Xia 夏 is traditionally considered as the region of the Xia dynasty (c. 2070–c. 1600 BC), 
the first dynasty in traditional Chinese history. It also denotes the people of the Xia, who consti-
tuted the first group of the Chinese nation. On the origin and meaning of xia, see Feng (2016, pp. 
32–35). 
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(Hsu 1960, pp. 6–7). Peoples living outside the Chinese realm and refusing to submit 
themselves to civilisation (that is, Chinese civilisation) were not foreign peoples, but 
uncultivated, outlandish peoples culturally inferior to the Chinese.  
 This cultural ethnocentrism is clearly seen in the terms used to denigrate all 
non-Chinese people outside the Chinese civilisation. As described in the Confucian 
classic the Book of Rites (Liji 禮記), “the wild tribes are the yi 夷 in the east, the di 
狄 in the north, the rong 戎 in the west, and the man 蠻 in the south. However great 
their territories are, they are called minors” (Legge 1885, p. 111).7 In fact, nothing 
expresses the contemptuous sentiments so well as the ideographic characters them-
selves. The term for southern barbarians, man, is written with an “insect” (chong 蟲) 
radical, and that for the northern barbarians, di, is written with a “dog” (quan 犬) radi-
cal. In Chinese eyes, barbarians were considered no different from the lower animals 
since they were ignorant of the beauty of the Chinese way of life and lacked the so-
phistication to appreciate reason and ethics as the Chinese did. By the same token, 
“the Chinese became barbarians if they debased themselves through uncivil practices” 
(Hsu 1960, pp. 6–8). This perception of cultural superiority over their neighbours is 
echoed in Mencius’s argument that “I have heard of men using the doctrines of our 
great land to change barbarians, but I have never yet heard of any being changed by 
barbarians” (Legge 1861, pp. 253–254). 
 What, then, was the proper and ideal way to deal with these “uncivilised bar-
barians”? Constant raids by the foreign tribes made Confucius (551 BC–479 BC) 
deeply concerned about the preservation of Chinese culture that it should not be cor-
rupted by barbarian customs, as he stated in the Chronicles of Zuo (Zuozhuan 左傳): 
“those distant people have nothing to do with our great land; those wild tribes must 
not be permitted to create disorder among our flowery states” (Legge 1872, p. 777). 
In the same book, Confucius further commented: “It is virtue (de 德) by which the 
people of the Middle State are cherished; It is by severity which the wild tribes around 
are awed” (Legge 1872, p. 196). Confucius’s idea, more positively interpreted, was 
to introduce the high culture of Chinese civilisation and moral values to the “barbar-
ian” peoples and thereby assimilate them into Chinese society. The corollary of this 
theory was that the way to assimilate barbarians, as prescribed by the classical teach-
ings, was to win their admiration for the grandeur of Chinese civilisation through 
correct conduct according to certain virtuous norms (Wang 1999, p. 288). In other 
words, the Chinese did not need to actively convert others to their way of life, ideas, 
values, and political system. The barbarians, on the other hand, were expected to 
voluntarily seek out Chinese civilisation and be transformed in order to enjoy its 
benefits.  
 But what if the barbarians, especially those militarily and politically strong 
enough to rival their Chinese counterparts, were not sufficiently bedazzled by China’s 
civilisation and were not willing to submit themselves to the Chinese cultural realm? 
In such cases, the Chinese would have to let go of – or at least conceal – their sense 
 
7 Whereas Legge translated zi 子 as “counts”, given the context of the sentence, “minors” 
should be more appropriate.  
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of cultural superiority and find different means of handling these potentially powerful 
and dangerous adversaries, as shown in the way the Northern Song Chinese viewed 
and dealt with the Khitan, their rival paramount in the north. 
From Diplomatic Initiation to the Treaty of Chanyuan:  
An Official Attitude of Parity 
As the once-dominant Tang empire finally crumbled in 907, the Khitan, distant de-
scendants of the Xianbei, seized this historical opportunity to rise from the Xar 
Moron 西拉木伦 Valley and established a dynasty in north China.8 The Khitan soon 
controlled a broad swath of steppe and grasslands in north Asia, with Yelü Abaoji 
耶律阿保機 (b. 872, reigned as Emperor Taizu 916–926) assuming the title of em-
peror in a formal ceremony in Chinese fashion in 916. In 938, during the reign of 
Abaoji’s son Yelü Denguang 耶律德光 (b. 902, reigned as Emperor Taizong 927–
942), the Khitan acquired the sixteen prefectures of Yan and Yun (Yan-Yun shiliu 
zhou 燕雲十六州), a vast region stretching from present-day Beijing to modern Da-
tong (Shanxi province). This marked the beginning of a hybrid multi-ethnic empire 
(Twitchett – Tietze 1994, p. 70).9 In 947, the Khitan ended Later Jin 後晋 (936–947) 
and finally gave their budding empire the name of Liao 遼, the Chinese name of the 
most important watercourse (the Xar Moron) in their homeland. While their Chinese 
counterparts were competing for survival and dominance, the Khitan successfully 
established themselves as the dominant power in the early 10th century. 
 In 960, the Song dynasty vanquished the last of the Five Dynasties, the Later 
Zhou 後周 (951–960). At the time, it looked as though it would be just another one 
of the short-lived dynasties of north China. The first two Song emperors, Taizu (r. 
960–976) and Taizong (r. 976–997), spared no effort in wiping out regional regimes, 
in particular those in the south and the west, to consolidate their empire. After the 
Song annexed the Northern Han 北漢 (951–979), a subordinate state of the Khitan, it 
finally had to directly confront its eminent rival in the north. Encouraged by his pre-
vious victory, Song Taizong embarked on his first campaign against the Liao in the 
same year, only to suffer a major defeat.10 
 It should be noted, however, that the first contacts between the Song and the 
Liao had already been initiated before this military confrontation. When the Song and 
the Liao courts made indirect contacts in 974 in the hopes of establishing peaceful 
 
18 The chronology of the Khitan before 930 is somehow contradictory. On their early his-
tory, see Wittfogel – Feng (1949). See also Twitchett – Tietze (1994, pp. 43–57) and Marsone (2011) 
for the predynastic and early dynastic history of the Liao. 
19 The founding ruler of the Later Jin, Shi Jingtang (r. 936–942), offered the sixteen prefec-
tures to the Khitan in exchange for their military support. For the Khitan cession of the region, see 
also Mote (1999, pp. 63–65). 
10 The Song troops were defeated by the Khitan force at Liao’s southern capital Yanjing, 
today’s Beijing, and Song Taizong barely escaped with his life. On the campaign, see Liaoshi, 12: 
109. 
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relations, both sides were relatively careful. In his letter to the Song, Yelü Cong 耶律 
琮 (927–980), the Khitan prefect of Zhuozhou 涿州, wrote: 
“There has never been the slightest fissure between our two courts.  
If envoys were exchanged and the intentions of our rulers were bared, 
this would rest our weary people and restore our good relations. … Why 
should we not have generations of friendly alliance and a regular ex-
change of gifts?” (Song huiyao jigao [hereafter as SHYJG], 8: 7673) 
To this conciliatory note, his Song counterparts in Xiongzhou 雄州, Sun Quanxing 
孫全興 (d. 981), was authorised to compose a favourable reply, proposing that the 
two states should become “eternal allies” (yuguo 與國) (Songshi, 3: 43). This corre-
spondence served as a diplomatic overture to normalise the relations between the 
two. The following four years witnessed a regular exchange of envoys: in 975, the 
Liao dispatched several missions; when Song Taizu died in 976, a special Liao envoy 
brought condolences, followed by another on the occasion of Taizong’s succession; 
envoys from the Liao arrived again in 977 and 978, and they were all feted and pre-
sented with rich gifts. Each time the Song also sent missions to Liao to express grati-
tude (SHYJG, 8: 7673; Songshi, 3: 43–46; Liaoshi, 9: 94–101). During this period, 
the Song–Liao bilateral relationship was aimed at preserving the status quo and based 
primarily on the exchange of embassies and gifts. 
 Song Taizong’s 979 campaign brought an end to the hitherto peaceful relations. 
The following two decades were marked by continued hostilities along the Song–
Liao border, peaking with Taizong’s second failed expedition against the Liao in 986 
until the Khitan launched a full-scale war against the Song in 1004.11 Given the 
military strength of the Liao, the war ended predictably with several Song defeats.  
At Chanzhou 澶州 on the Yellow River, a “treaty of alliance” was signed in 1005, 
known as the Treaty of Chanyuan 澶淵 (Songshi, 7: 125–127; Liaoshi, 14: 160). The 
main content of the treaty consisted of the following: 
 
 1. Establishment of a friendly relationship between the Song and the Liao; 
 2. Annual payments of 100,000 teals (ca. 3730 kg) of silver and 200,000 bolts 
(ca. 2400 km) of silk to the Liao by the Song as “military compensation”; 
 3. Demarcation of borders between the two states; 
 4. An agreement that neither side should construct new fortifications and canals 
along the border; 
 5. An agreement that neither side should detain robbers and fugitives; 
 6. A pledge of solemn oath with a religious sanction in case of contravention.12 
 
What emerges from the treaty is a strong sense of diplomatic parity, which in Wang 
Gungwu’s (1983, p. 55) words was “the nearest thing to equality in Chinese history 
until modern times”. Such diplomatic parity is further revealed in practices not stipu-
 
11 On the 986 defeat, see Twitchett – Tietze (1994, pp. 85–87); Tao (1988, pp. 10–14).  
12 The text of the treaty is recorded in Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian, 58: 22b–23a. On de-
tails of the treaty, see Schwarz-Schilling (1959, pp. 40–50, 108–137) and Wright (2005). 
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lated in the clause texts, since a fictitious kinship, which extended to members of the 
imperial households, was established between the two courts. The Song emperor 
Zhenzong (b. 968, r. 997–1022) became the “elder brother” of the Liao emperor 
Shengzong (b. 972, r. 983–1031), and this pattern was applied to the subsequent gen-
erations of emperors.13 In the same manner, the two states were established as “broth-
erly states” (xiongdi zhi guo 兄弟之國) (Twitchett – Tietze 1994, pp. 104–110; Wright 
2005, pp. 145–152). Missions were regularly sent to celebrate New Year’s Day and 
the birthdays of the emperors (and that of the Liao empress dowagers).14 Upon re-
ceiving the news of the death of an emperor, the other would immediately dispatch 
envoys to offer his condolences and for seven days no audiences to officials would be 
given. A detailed system of protocol was observed for receiving the envoys, includ-
ing rules regarding meal dishes, seating arrangements, location of accommodation, as 
well as manner of kneeling and prostration (Schwarz-Schilling 1959, pp. 56–57; 
Kuhn 2009, p. 45).  
 Aside from these exchanges, a new diplomatic language was also developed. 
After the Treaty of Chanyuan was signed, the Song court immediately issued an edict 
to change all place names hitherto containing characters such as “caitiff” (lu 虜) and 
“western barbarian” (rong 戎) in order to avoid potentially insulting the Khitan. The 
prefectures Weilu 威虜 (literally “deterring the caitiff”, in today’s Shangrao county in 
Jiangxi) was changed to Guangxin 廣信 (literally “extending faith”), and Jingrong 靖 
戎 (literally “pacifying the western barbarian”, in today’s Xushui county in Hebei) to 
Ansu 安肅 (literally “peaceful and solemn”). In addition, taboos concerning the Liao 
imperial family were observed. For instance, when Han Yi 韓億 (972–1044) was sent 
in 1026 to celebrate the birthday of Liao’s empress dowager, his name was “tempo-
rarily changed” to the homophone Yi 意 in reference to Liao Taizu’s Chinese name 
Yi 億 (Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian [hereafter as XZZTJCB], 104: 927).15 Four years 
later, another Song envoy Zhang Yi 張億 (fl. 1030s) also had his name changed to 
another homophone Yi 易 by imperial order when he accepted the mission (Liaoshi, 
17: 205). To handle the exchange of state letters with the Khitan, the Song established 
a special office, the State Letters Bureau (Guoxin 國信司), to guard against commit-
ting literary faux-pas in their diplomatic correspondences (XZZTJCB, 64: 12b).16 
 In the letter to the Liao during the negotiation of the Treaty of Chanyuan, the 
Song indicated that the two states (erguo 二國) should be friendly neighbours (Song 
da zhaoling ji, 288: 882). After the treaty had been concluded, the writers of diplo-
matic letters often addressed each other as the “northern dynasty” (beichao 北朝) and 
the “southern dynasty” (nanchao 南朝) (Hansen 2000, p. 307). Numerous reports 
and memorials from local governments on the Song–Liao border termed the Khitan 
as “northerners” (beiren 北人) instead of pejoratives such as “caitiff” (lu) or “barbar-
 
13 For the imaged relations between Song and Liao emperors, see Tao (1985, pp. 26–27). 
14 See Song da zhaoling ji, Chapters 288–232 for varieties of examples. 
15 The Liao source renders his name as Han Yi 韓翼, see Liaoshi, 17: 200. For a biography 
of Han, see Franke (1976, pp. 370–373). On the Song practice to avoid the naming taboo of mem-
bers of the Liao imperial household, see Wang Cengyu (2005). 
16 In 1054, the bureau was renamed as Office of State Letters (guoxin suo 國信所). 
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ian” 胡 (hu), and their land as the “northern side” (beijie 北界) (Tao – Wang 1974, 
pp. 723–740). Throughout official texts of the Song, terms as “the Great Song” (Da 
Song 大宋), “the Great Liao” (Da Liao 大遼) or “the Great Khitan” (Da Qidan 大契 
丹) appeared in state letters to the Liao, imperial edicts conveyed to Liao envoys, as 
well as replies acknowledging the receipt of gifts and expressing appreciation to the 
Liao court (Tao 1985, pp. 99–100).17  
 The neutral tone of the Song’s diplomatic language concerning the Liao is viv-
idly illustrated in Huarong Lu-Wei xinlu 華戎魯衛信錄 (Truthful Records between 
China and Barbarian in Lu and Wei), complied by Su Song 蘇頌 (1020–1101) who 
participated in diplomatic missions to the Liao in 1068 and 1077.18 Commissioned by 
the Song emperor Shenzong (r. 1067–1085) in 1081, the work included descriptions 
of Liao government and customs, Song correspondences with the Liao, and outlines 
of routes of the envoys.19 Although the main body of this work has been lost, its ex-
tant preface informs us that the chapters on Liao envoys, state letters, and documents 
appear under the headings of “northern envoys” (beishi 北使), “northern letters” 
(beixin 北信), and “northern correspondence” (beishu 北書). It is also stated in the 
preface that its chapters contain sections on “Liao imperial genealogy” (shixi 世系) 
and “Khitan national customs” (guosu 國俗), and the most common terms referring 
to the Khitan are the “northerners” (beiren 北人) (Su Weigong wenji, 66: 1a–5a). 
When the work was completed and presented to the throne in 1083, Shenzong was 
pleased and praised it “as proper as the text of the [section] ‘Sequences of the Hexa-
grams’ [of the Book of Changes]” and personally assigned the name of the work 
(Songshi, 340: 10865). But interestingly, the emperor used the term rong (barbarian) 
in the book’s title, which somehow shows that the emperor may not be as neutral as 
the writer.  
 The Song official rendering of terms concerning the Khitan is also seen in Sima 
Guang’s 司馬光 (1019–1086) Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑 (Comprehensive Mirror for 
Aid in Government), one of the most important contemporary histories. This seminal 
work referred to the Song’s northern neighbours simply as “Khitan” (Qidan), never 
inferior “barbarians” (Tao 1988, p. 77). In his four memorials to the emperor between 
1065 and 1086, Sima Guang talked about the “caitiff” only once in his 1067 memo-
rial, while in all other cases he used “Khitan” or “enemy” (di 敵) (Tao – Wang 1974, 
pp. 587–588, 600–601, 782–783, 784). This attitude resurfaced in Li Tao’s 李燾 
(1115–1184) Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian 續資治通鑑長編 (Collected Data for  
“A Continuation of the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government”), which con-
tained a wealth of terminological information regarding Song official documents and 
the veritable records (shilu 實錄). In almost all instances describing their northern 
neighbours, terms of “Khitan” (Qidan) and “northerners” (beiren) were used. Moreover, 
 
17 Examples of these texts can be found in Su Weigong wenji, Chapters 25–26; Nanyang ji, 
Chapter 15; Huayang ji, Chapters 18, 21, 23–25, 30–32; Fan taishi ji, Chapters 28–32. 
18 For a biography of Su, see Franke (1976, pp. 969–971). 
19 It took Su Song two years to finish the compilation. He was appointed “accompanying 
officer” (banshi 伴使) to receive and escort the Liao envoy during the compilation in 1082. On the 
work, see Jiang (2009). 
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terms of “China” (Zhongguo 中國) and “Liao” or the “northern dynasty” (beichao) 
appeared frequently in tandem in referring to the Song and the Liao (Tao 1985, pp. 
235–236). The usage of these neutral terms, instead of derogatory ones, reflects a 
clear sense of equality rather than disparagement. 
Realistic Assessment and Flexible Policy 
The fraternal treaty of 1005 brought a century of peace between the Song and the 
Liao. Although uneasy at times, in particular when the Liao – Xi Xia alliance of 1042 
forced the signing of another treaty that increased Song’s annual payment obligation 
to a total of 500,000 units of silver and silk (Qidan guozhi, 20: 5a; Tao 1988, pp. 57–
66), the brotherly relations sworn by the two emperors had been kept and no signifi-
cant military confrontation occurred.20 The two treaties succeeded in reaching “a non-
aggressive foreign policy with minimal concessions” (Kuhn 2009, p. 45), since the 
payments, even after increase, constituted less than two percent of Song annual mili-
tary expenditure during wartime (XZZTJCB, 150: 16a; Hansen 2000, p. 307). For the 
Song, the cost of peace far outweighed the cost of war: it was far more economical to 
bring hostilities to an end at an affordable price than to wage war or to cede territory. 
Buying-off their nomadic neighbours, as they had done with the Treaty of Chanyuan, 
was reaffirmed as a successful model for the Song not only in 1042, but again with 
the peace treaties with the Tangut Xi Xia in 1044 and with the Jurchen Jin 金 (1115–
1234) in 1141, 1164, and 1208.  
 However, behind such economic considerations, there was probably also an 
increasingly clear understanding of the might of the Khitan’s cavalry forces. In fact,  
a number of Song officials were realistic enough to accurately assess the Khitan’s 
military power well before the treaty of 1005. After Song Taizong’s failed expedition 
against the Liao in 979, his advisors Li Fang 李昉 (925–996) and Hu Meng 扈蒙 
(915–986) realised that the Song’s military was no match for the Liao and entreated 
the emperor to focus on strengthening the troops and securing financial resources in-
stead of planning new military actions (SHYJG, 8: 7676; XZZTJCB, 21: 11a–12a).21 
Following the second Song defeat in 986, Zhao Pu 趙普 (922–992), Song Taizu’s 
most trusted minister, remonstrated that no further military actions should be carried 
out, arguing that military ventures were detrimental to both the people and the state 
(Tao – Wang 1983, pp. 111–113).  
 Three years later, Taizong asked his officials to express their views on national 
defence and foreign policy. Almost all of them favoured peaceful approaches, the 
most common argument being that there was no guarantee that a war would be suc-
cessful and war was the worst policy if it was an ill-prepared one (XZZTJCB, 150: 
16a). The memorial of Zhang Ji 張洎 (933–997) was representative of his colleagues’ 
 
20 For details of the backgrounds and negotiation of the treaty, see Tao (1985, p. 232); Kuhn 
(2009, p. 46). 
21 See Franke (1976, pp. 552–555) for a biography of Li. 
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opinion.22 After weighing the pros and cons of various methods to deal with their 
enemies on the border, Zhang argued that the best choice was to adopt an active de-
fensive policy to resist the enemies when they invaded. However, given the Song’s 
limited military capacity vis-à-vis that of the Liao, Zhang concluded that even this 
policy was not in fact feasible. He then proposed that the only practical alternative 
left was: 
“[…] to put away the armour and bows, use humble words, give gener-
ous gifts, send a princess to obtain friendship, and transport goods in 
order to establish firm bonds. Although this would diminish the em-
peror’s dignity, it could, for a while, end warfare along the three bor-
ders” (SHYJG, 8: 7682–7683).23 
To bolster his argument, Zhang cited the example of how Tang Taizong (r. 626–649) 
indulged the greed of the Turks for years until he was ready to send forces strong 
enough to destroy them. Zhang believed that the Khitan were of the same ilk and 
therefore advised the Song emperor to bow low in order to save Song from danger 
and to wait for the right moment. Most of Zhang’s suggestions were incorporated 
into the Treaty of Chanyuan. The Song did not need to send a princess, but every-
thing else was exactly what Zhang had proposed.  
 These realistic views must have an enormous impact on the emperor. Emperor 
Taizong was aware that he had not, and would probably not, defeat the Khitan to 
achieve a true unification of China, thus he refused to approve his officials’ sugges-
tion to confer an honorary title on himself, citing his failure to recover the sixteen 
prefectures as the reason (Song da zhaoling ji, 3: 11). During negotiations of the treaty 
in 1005, when the Song emperor Zhenzong received Liao’s proposal for peace, he 
told his ministers that the periods of great prosperity in the past had been those when 
the sovereign of virtue profited from making peace with the “barbarian” enemies.  
He doubted the sincerity of the Liao message because he thought his virtue was not 
great enough to attract the Khitan, nor his majesty strong enough to awe them. Never-
theless, in his reply, Zhenzong expressed his willingness to negotiate peace, since it 
was his duty to bring peace and security to his people (SHYJG, 8: 7688). 
 With the conclusion of the treaty in 1005, formalised channels that shuttled 
Song and Liao envoys between the two capitals were established, and this enabled 
Song diplomats to make direct, personal observations of the Khitan. In order to acquire 
first-hand information about their northern neighbour, the Song court required their 
emissaries to keep detailed written records of their journeys and experiences (Hargett 
1985, p. 78).24 In addition to keeping record on travelling routes, natural geography, 
 
22 See Franke (1976, pp. 5–7) for a biography of Zhang. 
23 The translation is adopted from Wang (1983, p. 53). 
24 For a study of the Song ambassador system, see Franke (1983). On the chronology of 
diplomatic envoys between the Song and the Liao, see Nie (1935; 1940); Fu (1949); Zhang (1958). 
Selected reports of Song envoys to the Liao, collated and punctuated, are collected in Zhao (2017). 
For a French translation of five reports of envoys to the Liao, together with those of envoys to the 
Jin, see Chavannes (1897/1898). 
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Liao government system, and diplomatic protocols, some envoys also learned the 
Khitan language and were therefore able to communicate directly with their Liao 
counterparts. Yu Jing 余靖 (1000–1064) and Diao Yue 刁約 (fl. 1050s), for instance, 
even  composed  poems in Khitan, which were “favoured by the Khitan” (Qidan guo-
zhi, 24: 8b–9a).25 Although only very few of these records are extant, there should be 
little doubt that they were invaluable to the Song and had considerably influenced the 
Song’s image of the Khitan.  
 With the increase in knowledge about the Khitan, the Song recognised that the 
Khitan were stronger and more advanced than all other non-Chinese peoples China 
had ever encountered. Han Qi 韓琦 (1008–1075), chief chancellor in the 1050s and 
1060s, noted that the Khitan had embraced Chinese culture and they had been com-
peting with Chinese dynasties for hegemony for over a century since the Five Dynas-
ties. Confident in their power, the Khitan considered themselves superior to all non-
Chinese peoples of the past and had even come to believe that they were superior to 
the Song (XZZTJCB, 150: 16b–17a; Tao – Wang 1974, pp. 438–439).  
 Similar points were expressed in another memorial by Han’s colleague Fu Bi 
富弼 (1004–1083) who negotiated with the Liao for the second Song–Liao treaty in 
1042. The Khitan, as Fu explained, had not only adopted Chinese institutions includ-
ing government organisations, legal regulations, language and literature, but also pos-
sessed a formidable military machine that the Song lacked. Based on these facts, the 
Khitan should not be treated in the same way as the “barbarians” of ancient times. In 
urging for the Song to adopt a proper attitude toward the Khitan, Fu implied that the 
Liao should be regarded as a proper state and the Song, though the most civilised 
one, should realise that it was only one state among several other states (XZZTJCB, 
150: 16b–17a).  
 Both Han Qi and Fu Bi played important roles in Song–Liao negotiations 
during the early 1040s. When tensions began to flare again due to the formation of a 
Liao–Xi Xia alliance, the Song sensed a potential double-sided threat from its north-
ern and western borders (Ebrey 2014, pp. 375–376). Seeking ways to counter this 
threat, Emperor Shenzong called for open discussions of foreign affairs. Han and Fu, 
entrusted ministers of the emperor, were the chief proponents of the final decision to 
maintain peace with the Khitan, even at the expense of increasing annual payments 
(Tao 1985, pp. 63–70). Their realistic assessment of Liao power was fundamental to 
their recommendation for a rational course of action toward the Liao, which contrib-
uted to the successful solution to the new threat. At the same time, it was obvious that 
their assessment and attitude were influenced by the actual situation the Song was 
facing at that time. 
 The desire for peace did not mean that the Song court was unconcerned about 
its boundaries and national defence. From 1074 to 1076, the Song and the Liao held 
protracted negotiations to solve disputes over small swathes of borderlands. Before 
leaving for Liao as a special ambassador for the negotiation in the summer of 1075, 
 
25 Yu Jing was thrice-commissioned as an envoy to the Liao in 1043, 1044, and 1045. Diao 
Yue was sent to the Liao in 1056. For a detailed examination of their poems, see Zhao (2017, pp. 
36–37, 58). 
 
 SONG CHINA’S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE KHITAN LIAO 397 
 Acta Orient. Hung. 71, 2018 
Shen Kuo 沈括 (1031–1095), the premier statesman and scientist of his time, con-
ducted thorough research at the State Letters Bureau to gather documents and maps 
to support the Song’s claim. During six rounds of talks with Liao representatives, 
Shen firmly insisted that Song’s maps of the areas in dispute were correct and refuted 
Liao’s claims point by point (Zhang 1975; Tao 1985, p. 101). As a result, the Song 
was able to keep the Liao demands to a minimum and the border was re-established 
in Song’s favour.  
 In fact, even before the 1040s, the scholar and Confucian historian Ouyang 
Xiu 歐陽脩 (1007–1072) had already warned the throne that the Khitan were unpre-
dictable in nature and the peace treaty could not be considered permanent.26 Particu-
larly worrying was the fact that as the Song–Liao frontier lines were more artificial 
than natural, they did not follow geographical demarcations that were easily defensi-
ble (XZZTJCB, 119: 6b). The construction of canals, fortification posts, and even 
plantation of willow trees would help to slow down the advances of Khitan cavalry-
men, even though the Treaty of Chanyuan had proscribed such actions (XZZTJCB, 
141: 9a–11a). Ouyang’s view was supported by a number of officials who called for 
further strengthening national defence and preparing for an inevitable military con-
frontation (Tao 1985, pp. 125–126). 
Constructing a New Rhetoric of Cultural Superiority 
While Ouyang Xiu was clearly realistic in his assessment of the long-term prospects 
of Song–Liao relations, his personal attitude was not marked by cultural pessimism. 
The title of the section on the Khitan and other non-Chinese peoples in the New 
History of the Five Dynasties (Xin Wudai shi 新五代史), written by Ouyang Xiu 
during his exile from 1036 to 1039 and published in 1073, was a self-revealing one. 
Consisting of three chapters (juan 卷), a section was named “Appendix on Four 
Barbarians” (siyi fulu 四夷附錄). Although he acknowledged that the Khitan was the 
strongest amongst the “four barbarians”, it was still one of them and an enemy of the 
“Middle Kingdom” (Zhongguo) (Xin Wudaishi, 72: 885; Liu 2004, p. 192). In doing 
so, Ouyang reaffirmed the demarcation between Chinese and non-Chinese within the 
Chinese world order. 
 In a few contemporary works, the use of derogatory terms for the Khitan was 
more frequent and direct. In some cases, the ancient names for barbarians, such as 
Xunyun 獯狁 and Xiongnu 匈奴, were used to refer to the Khitan. In a comment 
made by Song Taizong in 991, he noted that “the Xunyun today [i.e. the Khitan] are 
different from ancient barbarians in their numerical strength, their constant change in 
policy, and their deceitful tricks” (XZZTJCB, 32: 4b–5a). More often, “caitiff” (lu) 
was used to denote the Khitan. For example, in the Old History of the Five Dynasties 
(Jiu Wudai shi 舊五代史), published in 974, the rulers of the Khitan were referred to 
as “chief of the caitiffs” (luzhu 虜主), and the people as both “Khitan” (Qidan) and 
 
26 For a biography of Ouyang, see Franke (1976, pp. 808–816). 
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“caitiff” (Tao 1985, p. 105). Wang Qinruo 王欽若 (960–1025), who was personally 
involved with the Song’s decision to seek peace in 1005, complied the Prime Tortoise 
of the Record Bureau (Cefu yuangui 冊府元龜) both during and after the treaty nego-
tiations. Wang used a series of terms ranging from neutral expressions such as the 
“Liao” and the “Khitan” to derogatory ones such as “caitiff”, “northern caitiff” (beilu 
北虜), and “barbarian caitiff” (ronglu 戎虜) (Cefu yuangui, 956: 11237–11241, 978: 
11488–11497).27 Such mixed and contradictory use of terms is also seen in Ye 
Mengde’s 葉夢德 (1077–1148) Talks of Swallows in the Stone Forest (Shilin yanyu 
石林燕語): 
“Now the Khitan have established a brotherly peace [with us]. […] 
when [Yelü] Longxu (Emperor Shengzong) was on the throne, he was 
the elder uncle to [Song] Emperor Renzong (r. 1022–1164). During the 
regency of Empress Dowager Mingsu 明肅 (968–1033, mother of Ren-
zong), the caitiffs sent embassies with letters to congratulate her on the 
New Year’s Day and her birthday. Our dynasty also sent embassies to 
reply [to the empress dowager of the Liao]. As exchange of letters be-
tween the wife of the son’s elder brother and the mother of the nephew, 
there is no enmity.” (Shilin yanyu, 2: 3b)28 
Although he clearly acknowledged the fraternal relationship between the Song and 
Liao emperors, Ye did not feel that his wording would offend the imperial family by 
calling its Khitan relatives “caitiffs”. These texts carrying terms insulting to the Khitan 
were circulating within the Song alongside those employing more neutral terms, 
which meant that they could eventually come to the Khitan’s attention. It was proba-
bly due to such fear that the Song government issued strict bans, though not neces-
sarily successful ones, on taking Song books into Liao territory, in particular volumes 
containing official documents or pertaining to current state affairs.29  
 While the usage of terms like “barbarian” and “caitiff” was meant to emphasise 
the demarcation between the “civilised” and the “barbarian” by resurrecting ancient 
terminologies, some Song scholars and officials were trying to develop a new set of 
rhetoric to culturally legitimise Song policy toward the Khitan. Ouyang Xiu was 
aware that the Song could not hope to best the Khitan in terms of military strength, 
let alone subdue them through assimilation or acculturation. To compensate for this 
political weakness in reality, Ouyang proposed a cultural approach to guide the 
Song’s policy toward the Khitan. Reviewing historical events, he lamented that many 
past Chinese rulers had failed to formulate an effective way to deal with the northern 
and northwestern “barbarians”, and whether or not the “barbarians” would invade 
 
27 See Franke (1976, pp. 1105–1109) for a biography of Wang. 
28 As formulated in the Treaty of Chanyuan, Song Shenzong, Renzong’s father, was consid-
ered as the elder brother of Liao Shengzong. Thus when Renzong ascended the throne in 1022, the 
Empress Dowager of the Liao, Shengzong’s mother, was considered the mother of Renzong’s father’s 
younger brother. 
29 On the Song prohibition on trading and smuggling books to the Liao, see Chan (1983, pp. 
13–14); Liu (2002); De Weerdt (2006). 
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China was an issue over which the Chinese could not exercise full control. Even the 
Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu 春秋) mentioned cases in which Chinese sover-
eign had to make concessions to the “barbarians” in order to maintain peace (Xin 
Tangshu, 217a: 6151). As regards the reason for whether or not the “barbarians” 
would invade and whether concessions were necessary, the Confucian notion of the 
“Way” (dao 道) was the deciding factor. Ouyang pointed out that even when China 
possessed the Way, the barbarians would not necessarily submit; yet, when China lost 
the Way, the barbarians would not necessarily invade. Thus, he urged the rulers to ex-
ercise great caution in foreign policy, since mishandling the “barbarians” would bring 
disaster (Xin Wudaishi, 72: 885). Ouyang Xiu’s mention of the Spring and Autumn 
Annals is meaningful here. Traditionally attributed to Confucius (551 BC–479 BC), 
this work is regarded as one of the Five Classics (Wujing 五經) of Confucianism.30 
By citing this classic, Ouyang was attempting to rationalise the reality of Song–Liao 
diplomatic parity – after all, this was an issue that even the ancient sages were not 
able to solve effectively.  
 After diplomatic relations between the Song and the Liao was normalised in 
974, Wang Yucheng 王禹偁 (954–1001) presented the “Hymn on the Northern 
Enemy’s Submission” (Beidi laichao song 北敵來朝頌) to the throne to laud Song 
Taizu’s accomplishment of attracting the “barbarians”, i.e. the Khitans, to submit to 
China. Wang offered a brief description of the Khitan’s savage customs and the 
traditional Chinese policies toward them, then he argued that the Song had employed 
the best policy, even superior to that of the Han and Tang dynasties’. This was be-
cause the Song relied on benevolence (ren 仁) in dealing with the non-Chinese 
peoples who lacked an advanced culture. The emperor, intending to “win the alle-
giance of the barbarians through kindness” (huairou 懷柔), treated them with propri-
ety (li 禮) and taught them with virtue (de 德). By adopting such policies, the em-
peror not only rallied the people of the Song to support his rule, but also attracted the 
barbarians envious of China’s culture. In Wang’s eyes, the establishment of diplo-
matic relations meant that the Khitan, termed as the “northern barbarian” and referred 
to as the Xiongnu, came to submit to the Song in the same fashion as the earlier bar-
barian did to the ancient sage kings (Xiaochu waiji, 10: 475). 
 The rhetoric of elevating virtue and morality to compensate for martial 
weakness, shrouded in orthodox Confucian references, became increasingly common 
as the bilateral relationship progressed. Zhao Pu pointed out in his memorial to Song 
Taizong that wise rulers in the ancient times had not interfered in barbarian affairs 
and had placed them outside the Chinese civilisation. Their policy combined military 
prowess (wei 威) with virtue (de) (Tao 1985, p. 111). In his argument for pursuing 
diplomacy, Zhang Ji cited the successful examples of Han and Tang dynasties and 
noted that peace was necessary to turn danger into safety. However, he insisted that 
this was not because of a lack of strength: 
 
30 On the Spring and Autumn Annals, see Cheng (1994). An accessible translation of the 
work is Legge (1872). 
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“Who would wish to exhaust resources of the Middle Kingdom to serve 
the worthless barbarian and harm our benevolence (ren 仁) and right-
eousness (yi 義) to quarrel with serpents and swine? Barbarian attacks 
in ancient times were merely compared with the sting of gadflies and 
mosquitos. […] Now is the moment for binding friendship and resting 
the people. If Heaven above indeed regrets calamity and [cause] the 
rogues to appreciate our benevolence, it thus would accept our wish for 
friendly alliance and extinguishing the frontier beacons. This would be 
a great fortune to our ancestral altars.” (SHYJG, 8: 7682)31 
When the Treaty of Chanyuan was signed, it was clear that it was the Song who 
bought off the Khitan with an annual indemnity of silver and silks. Yet many Song 
scholars asserted that it was the Khitan who wanted to end the war because they ad-
mired the virtues and moralities of China. Zhang Fangping 張方平 (1007–1091),  
in his “Hymn to the Song” (Song song 宋頌), described the treaty as nothing but a 
glorious victory of the Song since it were the “barbarians” who submitted themselves 
to the great culture of the Song (Lequan xiansheng wenji, 5: 4b–5a).32 The renowned 
Neo-Confucians Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) 
considered that the most important feature of the civilised Chinese is the practice of 
benevolence and righteousness. If they were even partially lost, the Chinese would 
descend into barbarianism; and if they were wholly lost, then people would sink to 
the level of animals. Therefore, all the ancient sage kings focused on benevolence 
and righteousness (Er-Cheng quanshu, 2a: 22b). For the Cheng brothers, during the 
period of disunity between 220 and 589, both propriety and institutions were lost, 
therefore the barbarians had prevailed. Although the Han and Tang were considered 
powerful, their rulers ruled by force rather than benevolence, thus they were “not 
worthy of being followed” (Song mingchen zouyi, 129: 8a–15b). The emphasis on 
benevolence and righteousness reiterates itself in another poem by Shao Yong, a 
pioneer of Neo-Confucianism alongside the Cheng brothers: 
The Armies of the Central Plain, 
Based themselves on benevolence and righteousness.  
When benevolence and righteousness are lost,  
The four barbarians come to insult.33  
Even Emperor Zhenzong was satisfied with the result of the treaty. Although a con-
siderable amount of annual payments was to be conceded to the Liao, Zhenzong, like 
many of his ministers, perceived the treaty as an ideal example of a successful policy 
that combined power and virtue. After the conclusion of the treaty, he said to the 
court:  
 
31 For an unabbreviated translation of the text, see Wang (1983, p. 54). 
32 For a biography of Zhang Fangping, see Franke (1976, pp. 16–19). 
33 Translated from the poem “Moaning on the Central Plain” (Zhongyuan yin 中原吟) col-
lected in Shao’s anthology Yichuan jirang ji, 18: 137. 
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“The northern borders have presented a threat [to us] since ancient times. 
[We] used to think about how to pacify them and all discussed about 
vanquishing the barbarians. Yet this would mean wars every day and 
high costs each year. Now [we] succeeded in making them fearing [our] 
military prowess and thus submitted to [our] righteousness. This has 
greatly comforted me.” (XZZTJCB, 58: 18a–18b) 
A corollary of such assertions was the belief that the Chinese culture was much more 
advanced than that of the barbarians and these culturally inferior people could be 
transformed by Chinese virtues. If the ruler successfully cultivated his virtue, which 
the barbarians cherished whole-heartedly, they would no longer desire to launch in-
cursions and then voluntarily come to submit (Wang 1968, p. 43). Since the barbarian 
menace was not as serious as internal problems, the Chinese rulers’ primary concern 
should be the pacification of their subjects and the cultivation of their virtue. Han Qi, 
for instance, held that all external threats started with internal problems. The barbari-
ans were always alert so whenever there were internal problems occurring in China, 
they would invade immediately (Song mingchen zouyi, 131: 5a). Although Sima 
Guang and Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021–1086) were bitter political rivals on the issue 
of domestic reform, during the Song–Liao border dispute negotiations of 1074–
1076, they both advised the throne that the emperor should first strengthen the Middle 
Kingdom and then conquer the barbarians (XZZTJCB, 237: 5a).34 
Concluding Remarks  
Despite initial military confrontations, the one event that set the tone for Song–Liao 
relations for over a century was the conclusion of the Treaty of Chanyuan in 1005, 
which was a de facto covenant agreed by both sides to replace hostile confrontations 
with a relationship of friendly tolerance. While it is true that the Song still employed 
a number of traditional policies to deal with the Khitan, this new model nevertheless 
marked the emergence of new dimensions in China’s foreign relations. The Song 
never succeeded in achieving suzerainty over the Liao; on the contrary, it was obliged 
to pay annual tributes to its nomadic neighbour in order to forestall war. Yet, at the 
same time, despite extreme distinctions between the ruling houses of the two states, 
the Song had managed to establish a fictional “brotherly” kinship ties to the Khitan. 
 Of course, this newfound relationship did not mean that the Chinese emperors 
intended to debase themselves as equals or even vessels of “barbarians”. Until the dis-
astrous defeat in 979, Song rulers and officials were relatively confident of their mili-
tary prowess; they readily made threats about military action and carried them out 
when necessary. It was only after 979 that the Song court realised, slowly and reluc-
tantly, that its military strength was no match for the Khitan. This painful recognition 
was accompanied by growing readiness to tone down its grandiose rhetoric through 
 
34 For a detailed discussion of Wang Anshi’s suggestions for policies toward the Liao, to-
gether with a discussion of those of Sima Guang, see Tao (1979). 
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adoption of neutral terms in place of the more chauvinistic ones. After 1005, the 
Song had fully accepted bilateral diplomatic parity and conducted their policies to the 
Liao based on realistic assessments and diplomatic flexibility. At the same time, these 
policies were conducted with an air of unwilling forbearance; the Song rulers had to 
swallow their pride of supremacy in order to accommodate the existence of the 
powerful Liao in the Chinese realm (Liu 2004, p. 192). 
 To compensate for their military inferiority and confer political legitimacy on 
the status quo, the Song endeavoured to construct a narrative of cultural superiority 
over their nomadic neighbours. Although neutral terms were used to refer to the Khitan 
in diplomatic documents and government texts, derogatory terms such as “barbarians” 
and “caitiffs” still often appeared in memorials and private writings, in particular if 
those were not supposed to be acquired or read by the Khitan (Tao 1985, p. 105;  
De Weerdt 2006, pp. 477–478). With the increased contacts with the Khitan, the Song 
scholars and officials, even emperors, began to see that there could be a way to deal 
with the reality and the rhetoric separately. Instead of acknowledging their inability 
to conquer the “barbarians” in the north, they returned to traditional ideology and 
terminology to justify their concession to the Khitan by exalting Confucianism’s core 
concepts such as virtue (de), benevolence (ren), righteousness (yi), and propriety (li). 
 It is therefore interesting to observe that the rise of the non-Chinese power of 
the Khitan in the north coincided with the rise of Neo-Confucianism in the Song. 
Almost all of the important figures of Neo-Confucianism in the Northern Song, as was 
shown above, had expressed their concern about Khitan incursions and commented 
on the proper course of foreign policy. One may presume that “the ponderance over 
non-Chinese powers in the north” caused the Chinese to search for their cultural 
roots in Confucianism (Wang 1999, p. 301). Of course, one may also argue conversely 
that it was Neo-Confucianism that reinforced the Song claim to be the cultural centre 
of “all under heaven”. Whatever the case, the Song developed a new set of rhetoric to 
compensate for the dynasty’s military weakness with confidence in is culture, thus 
continuing its practice of culturalism. 
 The dichotomy between the Song attitudes based on political reality and cul-
tural superiority is not a clear-cut one, and it is best understood as a discrepancy 
between Chinese culturalism and ethnocentrism. Because of the renewed menace of 
“barbarian” prowess, the Chinese were forced to move away from their time-honoured 
ethnocentric perspective on the proper world order. However, they still clung to their 
avowed cultural superiority, hoping that the cultivation of virtue would make the 
“barbarians” voluntarily submit. In doing so, they succeeded in depicting “all under 
heaven” in a dualist fashion, one in which culture was separated from politics.  
 Nevertheless, the Song rulers and officials never completely relinquished their 
ambition of re-establishing an ideal world order that would affirm both China’s po-
litical prowess and her cultural superiority. When the Khitan came under fierce attacks 
from the Jurchen in the 1120s, Emperor Huizong (r. 1100–1126) was determined to 
retake the “sixteen prefectures”. To this end, he was willing to break the treaty with 
the Liao and seek aid from another “barbarian” people, the Jurchen. However, this 
policy backfired: the Jurchen ousted the Song from north China and seized even more 
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territory from the Song, including its prosperous capital of Kaifeng (Kuhn 2009, pp. 
66–69; Ebrey 2014, pp. 379–389, 399–419). After decades of painful efforts to con-
solidate the remaining territories in the south, the Song reached a hard-won treaty with 
the Jurchen in 1141, but its terms were more humiliating than any of the previous 
ones. A century later, the Song saw another opportunity when the Mongols attacked 
the Jurchen, and they again broke the alliance in the hope that the lost territories 
could be reacquired (Kuhn 2009, pp. 91–92). When history repeated itself, the Song 
had nothing left to concede to the Mongols, but to accept its dynastic downfall. 
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